Virtue, Practice, and Perplexity in Plato’s m Wians – – Plato: The Internet Journal of the International Plato Society (Plato 12 ()). Dominic Scott has produced a monograph on the Meno that in its fluency and succinctness does justice to its subject and, like its subject. Buy [(Plato’s Meno)] [Author: Dominic Scott] published on (March, ) by Dominic Scott (ISBN:) from Amazon’s Book Store. Everyday low prices and free.
|Published (Last):||26 December 2007|
|PDF File Size:||6.98 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||10.83 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
It seems mere prejudice to deem Meno incapable of having a serious and sincere scoht in raising and then not retreating from the issue. Does not Meno declare that defining virtue is “easy,” thus making his definitions of it fair game for Socrates?
Nevertheless, as Scott sees him, the slave is thinking “for himself. One Virtue or Many? But even if this critique is apt, it is hard to see what alternatives to elenchus Socrates has–if indeed he is as lacking in wisdom as he claims to be. But its susceptibility to criticism is a virtue too.
Let us look at the four cases that Scott identifies as involving Socrates being put on trial. His book begins with an Introduction in which he offers a concise and accurate synopsis of the dialogue, followed by a defense of J.
Scott also strikes a balance between two other extremes: Meno in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy categorize this paper. Rather, as we saw above and as Scott is keen enough to emphasizeMeno expresses hesitancy about endorsing its application to virtue. Its treatment of these, though profound, is tantalisingly short, leaving the reader with many Scott says very little about what he thinks Plato would have taken the dialogue’s readership to be.
Is this mere coincidence? The first of two unifying themes that Scott identifies in the Meno is that of “Socrates on trial.
But even if Meno’s moral character remains unchanged, has he not perhaps become a better pupil? The Introduction is followed by fourteen rather short chapters that track the course of the dialogue domiic. Otherwise, it makes no sense to speak of the dialogue operating at menoo levels. Scott speaks of his “hesitation” 30but this may betoken thoughtfulness rather than stupidity. Cambridge University Press Amazon.
Grube – – New York: Sign in Create an account.
Plato’s Meno – Dominic Scott – Google Books
Cambridge University Press, Perhaps the reason he resists this further application is that the only thing he regards as genuine virtue is ruling others and having power and money, and not whatever it is neno women, old men, children, and slaves might have that goes by that name. Abandon it and we are free to observe Meno, without strain, as an imperfect but relatively decent interlocutor capable of reacting in a variety of different ways to various aspects of his encounter with Socrates.
It is only when Meno is made to venture an answer mneo is then subjected to intense scrutiny–that is, when he is made to look like a fool–that he becomes belligerent and offensive. Edited with Introduction and Commentary.
On several issues, he strikes out boldly on his own. There is every reason to expect that he would have cooperatively followed Socrates from the start had Socrates assumed the role of teacher. Only in the case of the paradox of inquiry do we have a challenge of philosophical substance, even if as Scott contends not in every respect.
Dominic Scott: Plato’s Meno.
The final three chapters, 16, and the Conclusion–raise and address critical interpretive issues: As far as 4 is concerned, might it not be that Socrates insists on the priority of definition because asking for a definition is the best way to elicit the views and commitments of his interlocutors? Thus “the dialogue operates at two levels” Scott finds some fault, however, in stating that the speech displays “resentment”, on the basis of its warning to Socrates not to travel abroad In any sominic, the fact that Socrates makes “use of the term ‘erisitc’ to describe the dilemma” 80 does not, without begging the question of Meno’s character, imply that Meno’s own “motives for using the argument are bad” ibid.
But if Plato’s criticism of Socrates amounts to little more than that Socratic inquiry is not always beneficial, that dominid is at times even counterproductive, it is hardly new to the Meno. The second unifying theme that Scott identifies is Meno’s moral diminic and education.
Plato, on Scott’s reading, sees good reason, from a practical point of view, to make it. Here, too, Scott adopts a kind of middle ground, recognizing that viewing the Meno in this way can be illuminating but noting that this approach has made it difficult for scholars to appreciate the work’s integrity.
Scott is surely incorrect to understand “would be able to do the same” as “would be able to become as expert as anyone” . We have indeed seen instances where Meno is pleased to continue the discussion so long as Socrates gives him what ;lato wants–for example, a definition of color that he likes see 77a; for other instances of his agreeableness when not confronted see 76d, 81a7, a9.
For Socrates, even that good that is most ecott agreed to be his ultimate good, happiness, is nevertheless “profitable”: If, however, the determination of what is philosophical begins with Socrates, with the life of inquiry and examination that he led, a life animated by questions and conducted through dialogue, can we be sure that philosophy excludes the employment of intentionally flawed arguments?
First, there is the character of Meno; and second, what Scott labels as “Socrates on trial” — the claim that in a number of important instances Menk positions are subject to challenge by Meno, such that Socrates is thereby scitt to offer an explicit philosophical defense for theses that may plao have had the status of undefended assumptions.
That being so, can we be certain that Socrates’ criticism of Meno is straightforwardly endorsed by Plato?
Plato’s Meno // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame
No keywords specified fix it. Such an approach requires us to make a rather scot distinction between Meno’s character and that of at least some of Plato’s readership. Scott so inflates what is involved in “following a proof” that it becomes comparable for him to how people discover “new geometrical proofs that no one had ever taught them” Thus in none of the four examples of challenges to Socratic assumptions that he identifies does Scott seem to me to make a convincing case for regarding Meno as displaying significant moral or intellectual deficiencies as an interlocutor.
Mill’s assessment of the Meno as a philosophical “gem. Meno remains the same bully now as before, and Socrates in effect warns us not to be taken in by his current turn to politeness and collegiality.
Scott contends that there is no final good in the Menothat, indeed, such goods are conspicuously absent from xominic dialogue